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Abstract. This paper presents work for the development of a framework to 
assure the security of networked medical devices being incorporated. The paper 
focuses on one component of the framework, which addresses system 
development processes, and the assurance of these through the use of a Process 
Assessment Model with a major focus on the security risk management process. 
With the inclusion of a set of specific security controls and assurance processes, 
the purpose is to increase awareness of security vulnerabilities, risks and 
controls among Medical Device Manufacturers with the aim of increasing the 
overall security capability of medical devices. 
1 Introduction 
The increase in networked Medical Devices (MDs) proves to be beneficial from both 
a business and medical point of view. However, there is a growing awareness of new 
security risks, threats and vulnerabilities associated with their use. The concern 
among the MD community is that technology has advanced but the security processes 
have not yet [1]. This became evident following a number of controlled hacking 
demonstrations where security researchers proved the vulnerability of MDs [2], [3], 
[4]. Also the Government Accountability Office (GAO) inquiry into the FDA’s 
assessment of MDs in 2012 [5] highlighted the lack of consideration for security 
vulnerabilities during the FDA’s MD approval processes. This paper discusses one of 
the two components of the security assurance framework: the process assurance. The 
other element of this framework deals with final product assurance [6] but is outside 
the scope of this paper. Section 2 describes the process assurance and discusses key 
standards. Section 3 concludes the paper and details the expected impact this research 
will have both on MDMs and regulatory compliance. 
1.1 Overview 
The key objective is the development and implementation of a Process Reference 
Model (PRM), a Process Assessment Model (PAM) (including a Process 
Measurement Framework in compliance with IEC/ISO 15504-2 [7]) for the assurance 
of MDMs development processes and the establishment of a process capability level. 
The aim is to positively impact MDMs in their design decisions during the 

















2 Security Process Assurance 
2.1 The Process Assessment Model in Compliance with ISO/IEC 15504 
The International standard for Software Process Improvement and Capability 
determination (ISO/IEC 15504) is used to establish the development process 
capability level.  Compliance with ISO/IEC 15504 results in the following outputs: a 
PRM, and a PAM (including an aligned Measurement Framework).  ISO/IEC 15504-
6 [8] details an exemplar PAM that contains two dimensions: the Process Dimension 
and the Capability Dimension. The Process Dimension utilizes the processes as 
defined in ISO/IEC 15288 [9] (which is a system development life cycle standard) 
and describes these in terms of their ‘Purpose’ and ‘Outcome’. The PAM expands the 
PRM with the use of Performance Indicators called Base Practices (BP) and Work 
Products (WP). Base Practices are the basic activities addressing the process purpose 
and describe ‘what’ should be done. Work Product performance indicators are process 
outputs and are used to review the effectiveness of each process. Combined evidence 
of Work Practice characteristics and the performance of Base Practices provide the 
objective evidence of achievement of the ‘Process Purpose’. The Capability 
Dimension, as set out in ISO/IEC 15504-2, utilizes six Capability Levels from Level 
0, ‘Non Performing’ to Level 5, ‘Optimizing’. These are the measurable 
characteristics required to manage and improve each process. ISO/IEC 15504-6 will 
form the foundation of the model as it contains the most suitable processes (ISO/IEC 
15288) necessary for the development of networked MD system.  
Figure 1 – Security Assurance Framework 
2.2 Building Additional Assurance into the PAM 
Due to the criticality of medical device security, additional assurance during the 
development life cycle is achieved with the inclusion of processes in the PRM from 
ISO/IEC 15026-4 [10].  ISO/IEC 15026-4 provides a process framework for systems 
that need assurance for particular critical properties. Critical properties are usually 
associated with substantial risk concerning safety, dependability, reliability or 
security. The standard presents a set of processes, activities and tasks intended to 
build upon the Agreement, Project and Technical processes as set out in ISO/IEC 
15288. Therefore conformance to this standard is achieved through the demonstration 
of these additional processes as well as conformance with ISO/IEC 15288. For this 
reason, demonstration of additional assurance specifically addressing security is 
suitable to enhance the PAM as set out in ISO/IEC 15504-6.  
2.3 Security Controls for the Risk Management Process  
To specifically address security as the system critical property focus is placed on the 
Risk Management Processes where we introduce new considerations and tools to be 
utilized during risk management activities. IEC/TR 80001-2-2 [11] is a technical 
report which sets out to promote the communication of security controls, needs and 
risks of medical devices to be incorporated into IT networks between MDMs, IT 
vendors and HDOs. This technical report presents 20 security capabilities for 
networked MDs. It forms the foundation for the security risk management process. 
The capabilities defined in IEC/TR 80001-2-2 have become part of the risk 
management process that the MDM must address and document. 
A security control mapping across an array of industry security standards has been 
conducted to strengthen the security risk management process. An exhaustive list of 
security controls from all security standards (as shown in Figure 1) has been compiled 
and these controls are mapped to their attributing IEC/TR 80001-2-2 capability. 
Subsequently, a gap analysis is being carried out to identify further capabilities that 
should be included in IEC/TR 80001-2-2. This will be achieved through the use of 
expert opinion (i.e. expert users from industry and the FDA). The validated security 
controls, plus the existing IEC/TR 80001-2-2 security capabilities, will form the 
foundation for the security risk management process and this will be detailed in a 
upcoming Technical Report (a work in progress). 
3 Conclusion 
This paper presents a framework for the assurance of networked MDs in terms of 
security. The solution combines an array of international standards and guidance 
documents to create a step-by-step process for MDMs.  The result is a tailored PAM 
for system life cycle processes (ISO/IEC 15504-6 using ISO/IEC 15288 as the PRM) 
with a focused risk management process (IEC/TR 80001-2-2) and additional 
processes for security assurance (ISO/IEC 15026-4). Currently there is no method to 
address the security development processes of networked MDs. This is the primary 
focus of this work. It is envisaged that the output of this research will positively 
impact the MD domain in both the EU and the US by building awareness of security 
vulnerabilities, threats and related risks for MDMs [6].  
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